Abstract-This paper investigates the secrecy rate maximization problem for the multiple-input-single-output multipleantenna-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel with multiple randomly located jammers. The multi-antenna base station (BS) transmits information signals along with artificial noise (AN) to disturb the eavesdropper. Moreover, the friendly jammers are properly selected to assist the legitimate link for better secure transmission with some payoffs. With this system model, we first formulate a Stackelberg game between the BS and the assisting jammers with full channel state information. Stackelberg equilibriums, including optimal fraction of transmit power for AN, optimal transmit power, and asking prices of assisting jammers, are first proved to exist and then analytically derived. A policy iterative algorithm is also proposed to obtain the optimal solutions. We then extend the Stackelberg game to the case of MISOME broadcast wiretap channel with channel distribution information of eavesdropper. Numerical results verify the accuracy of the derived results and the efficiency of the proposed algorithm. The results reveal that the proposed jammer-assisted secure transmission can greatly improve the secrecy performance and meanwhile save more energy for information signals, which is significant for future wireless communication.
conventional cryptographic methods implemented at the application layer to guarantee secure information transmission among legitimate nodes. However, with the development of computation capability of devices, the cryptographic based secure transmission methods become easier to break up by eavesdroppers.
Physical layer security, regarded as a promising technique that can provide additional security to wireless networks, especially in 5G networks [1] due to the relative simplicity of convergence of physical layer transmission technologies, has been developed based on information-theoretic concepts. Wyner established the so-called wiretap channel in [2] and proved that a secret message can be transmitted at a positive rate without revealing any information to the eavesdropper. Csiszár and Korner [3] extended the work to the nondegraded discrete memoryless broadcast channels and provided the secrecy capacity as the channel capacity difference between the legitimate channel and eavesdropper's channel. The secrecy capacity is positive only when the legitimate channel has better quality than the eavesdropper's. Hence, there are two ways to enhance secure transmission, improving the quality of the main channel and (or) deteriorating the quality of the eavesdropper's channel. Recently, many extensive researches aiming at increasing the secrecy performance of wireless communications by exploiting multiple antennas [4] , [5] , artificial noise (AN) [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] and cooperative jamming [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] have been investigated. The multipleinput multiple-output (MIMO) technique has great potential in improving secure transmission by exploiting extra diversity gains through beamforming [20] , transmit antenna selection [21] , power allocation [8] , etc. In particular, AN can be combined with beamforming when the number of transmit antennas is supposed to be large [7] , [9] , [10] . However, multiple antennas may not be available at some network nodes like mobile terminals due to cost and size limitations, and communication security can hardly be guaranteed when Eve is more capable than the legitimate user, such as when Eve equips more antennas than that at transmitter or the transmitter does not have any information about Eve. In such cases, cooperative jamming can be used to enhance the secrecy performance [11] , [13] , [14] , [16] , [17] , [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . A destination assisted cooperative jamming scheme has been proposed in [22] . In [23] , an uncoordinated jamming scheme has been proposed to maximize the secrecy throughput of decentralized networks 0090-6778 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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with single-antenna jammers. The [14] studied a hybrid cooperative beamforming and jamming schemes for two-way relay networks. [16] studied the multiple-jammer scenario where they assume each jammer can eliminate its interference to the legitimate destination. [24] proposed opportunistic multipleantenna jammer selection schemes to increase the secure degrees of freedom (DOF) of MIMO transmission in the presence of one eavesdropper. [25] considered a single-input multioutput multi-eavesdropper (SIMOME) wiretap channel with multiple friendly single-antenna jammers. A new opportunistic jammer selection scheme was proposed, where the jammers with channels nearly orthogonal to the channel direction of the legitimate channel are selected to transmit Gaussian jamming signals to confuse the eavesdroppers. [26] investigated secure transmission design in multiple-input single-output channels with a single cooperative jammer. These works assumed either a single jammer or independent multiple jammers, and all jammers are generous and will not charge for their services or contributions. This may not be practical in actual networks since various network entities intend to make independent and selfish decisions due to the development of large-scale, distributed, and heterogeneous communication systems.
To study the complex interactions among interdependent rational players like mobile users, jammers, relays and BSs, game theory [27] can be applied in wireless communication systems. The Stackelberg game, a classical and fundamental game in game theory, is employed in [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] to study the interactions between legitimate pair and friendly jammers who can assist the legitimate pair by transmitting jamming signals to interfere the eavesdropper. A Stackelberg game has been formulated for an multiple-input-single-output multiple-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel in [32] and [17] where an assisting jammer is employed to disturb the eavesdropper. Closed-form expressions for the Stackelberg equilibrium are derived, including the optimal transmit power and price for the assisting jammer. [29] considered a two-way relay system where the two sources communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay with the help of external friendly jammers, and all the nodes including two sources, untrusted relay and the friendly jammers are equipped with only one antenna. A Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme was formulated, and the optimal solutions for the power and prices were provided. Since there are no explicit solutions for such equations, a distributed updating algorithm was proposed to converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, a centralized optimization scheme was showed to compare with the Stackelberg-game-based distributed updating algorithm. A cooperative jamming strategy based on the Stackelberg security game to improve physical layer security over multiuser OFDMA networks has been investigated in [30] , where Wang et al. derived expressions for the optimal transmit power and proposed algorithm to solve the optimal prices for jammers. Also all the nodes in [30] are equipped with only one antenna. Overall, the aforementioned works are either the cases with one jammer or the cases with single-antenna at all nodes.
In this paper, taking the selfish property of assisting jammers into consideration, we investigate the physical layer security issues in an MISOME system with multiple single-antenna assisting jammers. Also, the BS sends information signals in conjunction with AN to interfere the eavesdropper. Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• For the case with full channel state information (CSI) of eavesdropper, we formulate a single-leader, multiplefollowers Stackelberg game between the BS and the jammers. The aim is to maximize the secrecy rate at the BS and revenues at jammers by optimizing both power allocations for the AN and the selected jammers, as well as the asking prices of the selected jammers. For the proposed Stackelberg game, the Stakelberg equilibrium, including transmit power and asking prices, is proved to exist and analytically derived. Since the optimal solutions are closely dependent with each other, a policy iterative algorithm for the converged Stakelberg equilibrium is proposed.
• As an extended work, we reformulate the Stackelberg game for a broadcast wiretap channel with only channel distribution information (CDI) of eavesdropper. In this case, we also prove the existence of the Stakelberg equilibrium and obtain the optimal solutions as roots of polynomial equations of degree higher than five. Since there are no closed-form expressions for such polynomial equations, another iterative algorithm obtaining the final solutions is proposed.
• Simulations are provided to verify the efficiency of the proposed scheme as well as the proposed algorithm and the accuracy of the derived analytical results. Numerical results indicate that when there is only one legitimate user, the maximum secrecy rate at the BS can be enhanced for about 8.77dB with 3 jammers and 10.33dB with 4 jammers compared with the results without jammers, and the maximum secrecy sum-rate of the BS can be improved 5.29dB with 4 jammers and 2 legitimate users. Moreover, the results reveal that the BS can allocate more power for information signals and less power for AN, which is meaningful for future wireless communications. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the system model and problem formulation are described in Section II. In Section III, the Stackelberg game for the optimization problem in MISOME downlink with multiple assisting jammers are investigated, after which the extension work of the Stackelberg game in the MISOME broadcast channel with only channel distribution information of eavesdropper is provided in Section IV. Simulation and numerical results are provided in Section V, and concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
Notation: Bold upper and lower case characters are used for matrices and vectors, respectively. (·) T and (·) H denote the transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively. Tr (·) and E {·} are the trace of a matrix and the statistical expectation of random variables. X 0 indicates that X is a positive semidefinite matrix. |X| denotes the determinant of X. I and (X) −1 denote the identity matrix of appropriate size and the inverse of matrix X, respectively. x 2 denotes the 2-norm of vector x. X denotes the Frobenius norm of the matrix X. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

A. System Model and Channel Model
We consider the downlink where a base station B S 0 with N B ( 2) antennas transmits confidential message to a legitimate single-antenna mobile user U E 0 in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve with N E (< N B ) antennas, as shown in Fig. 1 . B S 0 transmits information signals in conjunction with AN signals to deteriorate the Eve's channel. We assume a set of spatially dispersed single-antenna terminals AJ = {A J m } (|AJ | = M ( N E )) act as potential jammers. These jammers are selected to assist the secure transmission by sending jamming signals to interfere the eavesdropper and earn some payoffs from B S 0 .
Both standard path loss and small-scale fading are considered for the signal propagation. The standard path loss model is l (d) = d −α , where d is the distance between transmitter and receiver, and α > 2 is the path loss exponent. Firstly, full CSI of Eve is assumed to be available at B S 0 and assisting jammers to get fundamental insights into the security problem in Section III. Then we consider only channel distribution information (CDI) of Eve available 1 as an extension work in Section IV. The CSI of friendly jammers is assumed to be well known at B S 0 . 2 Denote by h ∈ C 1×N B and H E ∈ C N E ×N B the channel coefficients between B S 0 and U E 0 , and between B S 0 and Eve, respectively. h m,E ∈ C N E ×1 represents the channel coefficient between the m-th assisting jammer and Eve. 1 When Eve is an active terminal or terminal equipment associated with a BS (one BS except B S 0 ), Eve's CSI or CDI can be collected by B S 0 or its associated BS and share among BSs through station centric controller. 2 The CSIs of jammers belonging to different authorities can be collected by their associated BSs via uplink training and exploiting the channel reciprocity between uplink and downlink. Then the BSs can share the CSI by forwarding the CSI to the station centric controller.
The elements of channel matrices are modeled as mutually independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
The transmit signal at B S 0 is x = √ (1 − φ) P s ws + z, where s is information symbol with E ss H = 1 [34] . φ is the fraction factor of P s (total power at B S 0 ) allocated to the AN signal z. Since complete CSI of all links are available, we adopt maximum-ratio-transmission (MRT) [35] at B S 0 , i.e., the precoding vector at B S 0 is w = h H h . Denote G an orthogonal subspace of the channel vector h. To maximize the interference at Eve while null AN at the legitimate receiver, we adopt the AN precoding matrix as the orthogonal projection of H E onto the subspace G [36] , i.e., [32] , [29] , and [30] where the jamming signals sent by the friendly jammers can be completely decoded and nulled out at the legitimate users via certain signal design methods. For example, in this paper, the selected jammers adopt distributed beamforming 3 to send jamming signals in the orthogonal subspace of the channel between assisting jammers and the legitimate user (h J ∈ C 1×M ) while maximizing interference at Eve, i.e.,
Then based on the system model and the assumptions, the received signals y and y E at U E 0 and Eve can be expressed, respectively, as:
and Thus, applying the Shannon capacity formula, the achievable rates of legitimate channel and the Eve's channel for the user's information are shown as: 0. As a result, the achievable secrecy rate at B S 0 can be expressed as [37] :
B. Problem Description
The main objective of this paper is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate at B S 0 by optimizing the transmit power for AN at B S 0 , i.e., optimal φ, and simultaneously properly selecting jammers with optimal transmit power for each assisting jammer. In practical wireless networks, the friendly jammers are selfish terminals belonging to different authorities and with diverse goals. These users may not cooperate to help others without earning any benefits. Thus, in this paper, we assume the friendly jammers will charge some payoffs for their cooperation. Hereinafter, we conclude our problem as following: B S 0 aims to achieve the best secrecy performance with the least payments, while each assisting jammer aims to earn as many profits as possible. Based on the descriptions, we first formulate this problem using a Stackelberg game [27] where B S 0 acts as the buyer or leader that starts the game and the assisting jammers act as the sellers or followers that follow the game, and then investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium for the formulated Stackelberg game, including the optimal solutions of φ, transmit power and asking prices for assisting jammers.
III. STACKELBERG GAME FOR MISOME DOWNLINK WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH FULL CSI
In this section, we study the optimization problem in the MISOME downlink wiretap channel. Full CSI of Eve is available at B S 0 and jammers. First of all, a Stackelberg game with one leader and multiple followers is formulated. Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game is defined and proved to exist. The corresponding solutions are also derived. Since the solutions are roots of M + 1 equations with M + 1 variables, a policy iterative algorithm obtaining the optimal solutions is proposed in the end of this section.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
The Stackelberg game for the optimization problem can be divided into two stages from the view of B S 0 and the assisting jammers.
1) B S 0 (Leader) Side Game:
The achievable secrecy rate at B S 0 can be rewritten as:
Considering the selfish property of assisting jammers, we assume B S 0 pays the m-th assisting jammer according to its contribution in interfering Eve, i.e.,
, m = 1, 2, ..., M. Therefore, the utility function of the leader side can be defined as
where
.., μ M ) denote vectors of transmit power and asking prices of the assisting jammers, respectively.
is the total cost for all the assisting jammers. μ 0 is the economic gain per unit secrecy rate of confidential messages. μ m is the asking price per unit interference power of the m-th assisting jammer. With these preparations, we formulate the leader side game as achieving the maximum utility by investigating an optimal value of φ and an effective transmit power allocation for each assisting jammer. Thus, B S 0 (leader) side game can be expressed as the following problem:
where P J max is the maximum transmit power of assisting jammers. Note that P J m = 0 indicates that the m-th jammer is not included in the jamming group. This may occur for three cases. Firstly, when B S 0 would like the m-th jammer to interfere Eve with the maximum transmit power, the m-th jammer will ask as much as it can to maximize its utility, which in turn will harm B S 0 's utility. Secondly, when the interference generated by the m-th jammer is limited compared with others while it charges very high. Lastly, when B S 0 transmits AN with all its power, i.e., φ = 1. This case will not happen in reality, we set this to make sure that the domain of φ is compact space.
2) Assisting Jammers (Follower) Side Game: For each assisting jammer, we define the objective of each jammer as maximizing its revenue by contributing the interference to Eve. Thus, the utility function of the m-th assisting jammer is defined as:
The aim of each assisting jammer as a seller is to set an optimal asking price to maximize its revenue. Thus, the assisting jammers side game can be expressed as:
So far, problems P 1 and P 2 form a Stackelberg game for the MISOME downlink wiretap channel with the transmit power constraint.
Remark: In P 1 and P 2, the transmit power of each assisting jammer is a function of its asking price μ m as well as its contribution in interfering the eavesdropper, and each assisting jammer's asking price in turn is a function of the jammers' transmit power P J m , i = 1, 2, ..., M, which indicates that the amount of jamming power that B S 0 will buy from the m-th jammer and the price asked by the m-th jammer depend closely on all other jammers' transmit power.
B. Definition and Existence of Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium of a Stackelberg game is defined as a set of solutions at which none of the game player, i.e., the legitimate transmitter B S 0 or assisting jammers here, can further improve its utility by changing only its own strategy. Therefore, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the Stackelberg game formed by P 1 and P 2 can be defined as follows.
Definition 1: Denote by φ opt ,
the Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game, then for any φ, P J and u, there exists
According to the definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium, the conditions of the existence of the equilibrium are provided in the next lemma. (8) and (10) that U B and U J m satisfy the first two conditions. The last condition will be proved in the following subsection, where we analyze and investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game.
C. Solutions for the Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium is analyzed from two sides respectively. Firstly, the best response of the leader (B S 0 ), i.e., φ opt and P J _opt , which can be obtained by solving P 1, is in term of asking prices as well as all other jammers' transmit power. Then, the best response of the followers (assisting jammers), u opt , can be obtained by applying φ opt and P J _opt into P 2.
1)
Step 1: Solving Optimal Power Allocation: φ opt and P J _opt : First of all, some identities and properties of matrix are presented in the following lemma, which is useful for later deduction.
Lemma 2: For any n × n variable matrix X, • The differentiation of log |X| is [39] d log |X| = Tr X −1 dX .
• For constant matrix A and B, the differentiation of Tr AX −1 B is [39] dTr 
With the definition of A 1 , A 2 and A 3 , then A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ∈ C N E ×N E are positive defined Hermitian matrices. Based on these, the objective function in P 1 is proved to be a concave function in term of φ and transmit power of each assisting jammer in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: U B φ, P J , u is strict concave in term of φ and P J m , m = 1, 2, ..., M.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Since U B φ, P J , u is strict concave in term of φ and P J m , m = 1, 2, ..., M and the supporting set φ and P J are convex, then the global optimal solutions of problem P 1 can be obtained by setting (40) to zeros according to Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) condition [41] .
Theorem 1: The optimal value φ opt maximizing the utility of B S 0 is the solution of the following equation
where 
and ., M, which means that the choice of the jammer's optimal transmit power is effected not only by its own channel condition but also all other jammers' channel conditions.
2)
Step 2: Solving Optimal Asking Prices of Assisting Jammers u opt : Expressions for the optimal transmit power of assisting jammers are derived as (18) . The goal of each assisting jammer as a seller is to set an optimal asking price that maximizes its utility. Substituting (18) into (10), problem P 2 can be rewritten as: 
And the second derivative is
Therefore, substituting into (25), we can easily obtain
Lemma 4 shows that U J m is a concave function, which satisfies the third condition of the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium in Lemma 1. Therefore, the Stackelberg equilibrium exists for the proposed Stackelberg game, and the optimal solution for the asking prices of assisting jammers can be obtained by setting to be zero.
Theorem 3: Based on the optimal solution obtained in Theorem 2, the optimal solution for the asking price maximizing the utility of each assisting jammer is
is a concave function in term of μ m , the optimal asking price of the m-th assisting jammer can be obtained by setting (22) to be zero. As mentioned before, when P J _ * m 0, the m-th assisting jammer will not join to interfere the eavesdropper and when P J _ * m P J max , the m-th assisting jammer will do its best to interfere the eavesdropper and make its asking price as high as possible to maximize its benefits. For this two cases, U E 0 is unwilling to ask for help from the assisting jammer because U E 0 cannot improve its utility, and thus we define μ m = ∞ so as to make P J _opt m in (18) to be zero. For the case 0 P J _ * m P J max , the detailed proof can be found in Appendix C.
Note that the derived optimal solutions of transmit power and asking prices of jammers are unique for the Stackelberg game because of the concavity of the optimization problems [43] . Eqs. (18), (19) , (26) and (27) show that the optimal asking price as well as the optimal transmit power of the m-th assisting jammer is a function of all other jammers' transmit power (26) into (18), the optimal transmit power of assisting jammers that maximizes U U E 0 is given as
D. Policy Iterative Algorithm Obtaining Optimal Solutions for the Stackelberg Equilibrium
It is hard to directly solve the M + 1 equations as in (17) and (28) , Thus, in this section, we proposed a policy iterative algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated Stackelberg game, as shown in Algorithm 1. First of all, initializing the transmit power of the assisting jammers as zeros. Then solving φ opt with bisection algorithm. When all the updated transmit power nearly keeps unchanged, the updation stops. Otherwise, another round of iteration starts. 
Calculate μ m (t + 1) as (27) We further extend the above work to the MISOME broadcast wiretap channel with multiple legitimate users simultaneously served by B S 0 . Moreover, only channel distribution information instead of full CSI of the Eve's channel is available at B S 0 . Based on the system model and the assumption, we reformulate a Stackelberg game with the goal of maximizing the average secrecy sum-rate at B S 0 . The Stackelberg equilibrium is also proved to exist and analyzed.
A. System Model of MISOME Broadcast System Under CDI
We assume that K (K N B − N E ) 4 legitimate users are associated with B S 0 . The transmit power for confidential messages are equally allocated to each user, and thus the transmit signal at B S 0 can be expressed as x = jammers and the legitimate users (H J ∈ C K ×M ) to disturb the eavesdropper, i.e., x J = T J v J , where T J ∈ C M×M−K 5 is an orthogonal basis of the null space of H J .
Since legitimate users' CSI and Eve' CDI are available, we define secrecy rate of the k-th legitimate user's information as Eq. (30) [7] , [32] , which later will be used to formulate the objective function of leader side game. Note that with Eq. (30), the optimal power allocation can adaptively update with legitimate users' CSI.
B. Reformulated Stackelberg Game for the Broadcast Wiretap Channel
Based on the system model, B S 0 aims to maximize its average achievable secrecy sum-rate by properly allocating transmit power for AN and transmit power of each assisting jammer. The leader side (B S 0 ) game can be expressed as the following problem:
and the follower side (assisting jammers) game can be re-expressed as:
Problems P 3 and P 4 together reformulate the Stackelberg game and the solutions of the Stackelberg equilibrium will be investigated in the next subsection.
C. Solutions of Stackelberg Equilibrium
Differentiating the objective function of problem P 3 with respect to φ and P J m , we have
and the second derivatives are
5 If M K , T J does not exist and the jammers will not joint to disturb the eavesdropper.
and
With the same derivations as in Section III, we can easily obtain that
< 0 and
2 < 0. Then combining with (33) and problem P 3, the global optimal value φ opt and P J _opt m , m = 1, ..., M can be obtained by setting
With some manipulations, Eqs. (36) and (37) are polynomials equations of degree higher than five and four, respectively. According to the Abel-Ruffini theorem [42] , there is no explicit formula for such equations over the rationals in terms of radicals. Therefore, we cannot provide closed-form expressions for the optimal value φ and P J m , m = 1, ..., M. Then, numerical approximations of solutions could be provided by any root-finding algorithm for polynomials.
Denote by P J _opt m the optimal transmit power of an assisting Solve μ m using Eq. (39) and inserting the result into P J m (t + 1); 8: if P J m (t + 1) 0 or P J m (u) (t + 1) P max then 9: μ m = ∞, P J m (t + 1) = 0; 
With the derived equations, we proposed the Algorithm 2 to obtain the optimal solutions.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide the numerical results to validate our theoretical analysis and evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. We consider a wiretap channel model as in Fig. 1 , where B S 0 is located at the origin of the coordinate plane while the legitimate user U E 0 and the eavesdropper are located at (0,300m) and (300m,0), respectively. M = 4 friendly jammers U E 1 , U E 2 , U E 3 and U E 4 are uniformly distributed within the square with length 750m and centered at the eavesdropper. B S 0 is equipped with N B = 4 antennas. The transmit power at B S 0 is P S = 40dBm and the maximum transmit power at each assisting jammer is P J max = 37dBm. The noise variance σ 2 = −104dBm (i.e., 10MHz bandwidth) and the path loss factor is α = 5. Each entity of the channel coefficients, i.e., entities in h UE 0 , H E and h m,E , is assumed to be Rayleigh fading with unit mean. The economic gain per unit secrecy rate μ 0 = 50.
For the special case with two randomly located jammers. U B 0 's utility function as a function of fraction factor φ and two jammers' transmit power are shown in Figs. 2-3 , respectively. The jammers' utility functions are shown in Fig. 4 . Each realization in Figs. 2-4 is a deployment of two randomly located jammers with independent channel realization. The numerical results verify the analysis in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that U B φ, P J , u is concave in term of φ and both P J 1 and P J 2 . And the assisting jammer's utility function U J m is concave in term of its asking price μ m . Moreover, notice that in Fig. 4 , U J m is strictly concave when the asking price is below a specific value and becomes zero when the asking Utility function of B S 0 as a function of φ. Six realizations with two randomly distributed jammers and independent channel realization. for the left figure and
for the right figure. K = 1 legitimate user , N E = 1.
price increases, which is coincident with the analytical results that when the asking price is too large, U B 0 would not prefer to ask for help from this jammer, and thus the transmit power of this jammer is zero, and this jammer earns nothing. For the case with multiple assisting jammers, Algorithm 1 is applied to solve the optimal solutions for the Stackelberg equilibrium. Two cases with M = 3, N E = 2 and M = 4, N E = 3 are numerically analyzed to validate the derived analytical results in Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and the practicability of the iterative Algorithm 1. U E 1 , U E 2 and U E 3 are selected as friendly jammers with M = 3, and all the four friendly jammers are joint to interfere the eavesdropper with M = 4. The curves in Figs. 5-9 reveal that the iterative algorithm converges to the optimal solutions within about 4−6 loops, which verifies the efficiency of the proposed algorithm. It can be seen from Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 that with the help of assisting jammers, the reduction (10% ∼ 14%) of the transmit power for AN at B S 0 is much more than or almost the same with the total transmit power at assisting jammers, which is meaningful for energy-saving and future wireless networks. Combining the results in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , we can see that with 3 friendly jammers and 4 friendly jammers, the optimal transmit power of the first jammer and the second jammer are zero and their asking prices are infinity, which is coincident with the analytical results in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. There are two reasons for the result, 1) this friendly jammer can provide very little interference to the eavesdropper. 2) the asking price of this jammer is too high.
Combining with the utility functions of friendly jammers in Fig. 8 , it is very easy to get the conclusion that with 3 friendly jammers and 4 friendly jammers, the first jammer and the second jammer will not assist to disturb the eavesdropper and therefore earn nothing. Fig. 9 illustrates the utility curve and maximum secrecy rate achievable at B S 0 . Besides, To compare the proposed Stackelberg equilibrium solution with centralized optimal solution, a virtual centralized controller aiming at maximizing the secrecy rate at B S 0 is assumed to exist. The centralized optimal solution is obtained by searching through φ and P J m , m = 1, ... with the power constraint. From the right side figure, we can see that the final Stackelberg equilibrium solution almost achieves the centralized optimal solution with the iteration, which verify the effectiveness of the proposed Stackelberg game-based optimal solution and algorithm. Moreover, the secrecy performance improves for about 8.77dB with 3 friendly jammers and 10.33dB with 4 friendly jammers compared with the result without any jammers.
The former mentioned simulations focus on scenario with perfect CSI of eavesdropper and only one legitimate user. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 are the results for the broadcast wiretap channel with channel distribution information of eavesdropper available. K = 2 legitimate users are located at (0, 300m) and (300m, 300m). The number of antennas equipped at B S 0 and Eve are N B = 4 and N E = 2, respectively. M = 4 randomly located jammers are joint to interfere the eavesdropper. It can be seen from these figures that the optimal solutions converges in about 5-7 loops and the maximum secrecy rate almost achieves the centralized maximum secrecy rate, which proves the accuracy of the analytical results and the efficiency of the proposed iterative algorithm. In addition, the maximum secrecy sum-rate could achieve about 5.29dB improvement compared with the scheme without assisting jammers, and the transmit power for AN at B S 0 greatly reduces, which means that the base station allocate more power for information signals. Combining with the results of Figs. 5-11, the proposed multi-jammer assisting scheme makes great contribution for energy-saving and enhances energy efficiency for the wireless communication system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the secrecy rate optimization problem for the MISOME wiretap channel with multiple jammers was investigated. The BS transmits information signals along with AN signal to confuse the eavesdropper. Besides, the jammers are properly selected with the optimal transmit power to deteriorate eavesdropper's channel. Two Stackelberg games were formulated to solve the secrecy rate maximization problem for an MISOME downlink wiretap channel with full CSI of eavesdropper and an MISOME broadcast wiretap channel with only channel distribution information of eavesdropper. The Stackelberg equilibriums were proved to exist and analytically derived for the proposed games. Since the optimal transmit power and asking prices are closely dependent with each other, two iterative algorithms obtaining the final convergent solutions were proposed. Simulation results were provided to confirm that the Stackelberg equilibrium is an efficient solution and the analytical results are validated. Comparing with the system without assisting jammers, the maximum achievable secrecy rate at the BS increases 8.77dB with 3 assisting jammers and 10.33dB with 4 assisting jammers when there is only one legitimate user, and the maximum achievable secrecy sum-rate at the BS increases 5.29dB with 4 assisting jammers and 2 legitimate users. Moreover, with the assistance of jammers, the BS allocate more power (e.g., save about 50% of total transmit power at BS with 4 jammers and two legitimate users) for information signals. The proposed multijammer assistance scheme is proved to significantly improve the secure transmission and save more energy for information signals, which is meaningful for future wireless networks.
Note that the studied problem in this paper works well with CSI in each time slot and can update from one time slot to another time slot. When there is huge fluctuations of nodes locations and states, real-time updating and complexity of CSI model are the two main challenges that needed to be solved. In addition, the derived optimal results are obtained under suboptimal precoder assumption. The optimal system design, i.e., joint optimization of precoding matrix and power allocation, will be the focus of our future work. 
And the second derivative of (8) with respect to φ and P J m is
Thus, what we have to do is to differentiate R S . The derivative 
where (b) is followed by the matrix identity Tr (AB) = Tr (BA) [40] . 
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof is divided into two parts: solving the optimal value of φ and optimal transmit power of assisting jammers.
A. Solving Optimal Fraction Factor φ opt
According to ( 
Then, after mathematical derivations, φ opt can be obtained by solving (17) .
B. Solving Optimal Transmit Power
Applying the same matrix identities in the first part and 
